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This paper investigates the relation between ﬁnancial development and
ﬁrm size. The model shows that the quality of laws, by aﬀecting the level
of monitoring costs, has an eﬀect on risk sharing and, through this channel,
on the investor basis and the availability of external ﬁnance to ﬁrms. If,
because of high monitoring costs, the provision of ﬁnance to projects is
concentrated in very few individuals, the risk premium rises steeply with
the amount of funds ﬁrms demand. As a consequence, in countries where
the ﬁnancial system does not favor risk sharing, the larger the optimal size
of a ﬁrm would be, the higher is the cost of external ﬁnance; this limits ﬁrm
size. Empirical evidence is also provided. The cost of debt is higher for
ﬁrms demanding larger loans, even after controlling for leverage and other
ﬁrm characteristics. Moreover, in countries where the ﬁnancial system is
less developed, ﬁnancial constraints, indeed, appear more stringent for ﬁrms
whose optimal size is larger.
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The literature on law and ﬁnance based on the inﬂuential papers of La Porta et
al. (1997 and 1998) studies the eﬀects of the quality of investor protection on the
allocation and the cost of funds. It argues that managers and entrepreneurs can
divert proﬁts from outsider investors at a cost that increases in the level of investor
protection and the fraction of equity owned by insiders. Consequently, if investor
protection is poor, investors have an incentive to provide external funds only if
the ﬁrm manager maintains a relatively high fraction of equity. Based on this
argument, the literature has established a connection between weak institutions,
insider ownership concentration and ineﬃciencies in the allocation of funds.1 The
common conclusion is that in countries where diversion problems are more severe,
distortions in investment decisions are more pronounced.
A less studied but complementary source of distortion in the allocation of
investment consists in the underdiversiﬁcation of investors and intermediaries’
portfolios that, as diversion problems, may originate from lack of transparency
and poor enforcement of law.
Indeed, there is evidence that problems of enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts
may limit risk sharing with possibly substantial consequences for investment deci-
sions and business growth. The empirical evidence shows that credit cooperatives
and peer monitoring within the local community can be essential to guarantee
credit availability when there are severe problems of enforcement of ﬁnancial con-
tracts (Banerjee et al., 1994). This is true not only in countries with underdevel-
oped ﬁnancial systems but also in advanced economies. Angelini et al. (1998) ﬁnd
evidence that cooperative banks easy access to credit for their members in Italy.
Even US mutual fund managers overweight locally-headquartered ﬁrms in their
portfolios (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) because they seem to have an informa-
1See for instance La Porta et al. (1999), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000), Burkart and Panunzi
(2001).
2tional advantage in evaluating nearby investments. Moreover, Guiso et al.(2001)
show that household stock market participation is signiﬁcantly larger in the US
and UK than in Italy, where the rule of law is weaker. Finally it is well-known
that as a result of market imperfections ﬁnancial markets, which are the primary
instrument for risk sharing, are undercapitalized where investor rights are poorly
protected.
This empirical evidence suggests that lack of transparency, weak investor pro-
tection and poor enforcement of laws favouring fund provision at the local level
may limit the number of investors who share business risk. The lack of risk sharing
in turn may have sizeable eﬀects on the cost of funds and investment decisions,
which are worth studying.
This paper takes up these issue. It argues that the quality of investor protection
inﬂuences the cost of investing in a ﬁrm, because the worse are the accounting
standards and the ﬁnancial laws and the poorer is their enforcement, the more
diﬃcult is to acquire ﬁrm level information and the more intense is the monitoring
activity needed to appropriate the investment return. To a large extent, the
ﬁnancial resources and the eﬀort needed to protect one’s own rights and to enforce
the contracts do not depend on the size of the investment. This creates a ﬁxed
cost in ﬁnancing a new ﬁrm and, from the point of view of each investor, makes
the return to investment to be positively correlated with its size. Consequently,
even if there are beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation, investors ﬁnd it optimal to fund
only a few ﬁrms. In equilibrium, this determines among how many ﬁnanciers
business risk can be distributed: the larger are the ﬁxed monitoring costs, the
more concentrated are a ﬁrm’s sources of ﬁnance. This has consequences on ﬁrm
size, investment and the cost of funds. The fewer are the investors who directly
or indirectly, through a ﬁnancial intermediary, participate in ﬁnancing a ﬁrm, the
more their future wealth will be correlated with the ﬁrm’s output. Consequently,
the risk premium that risk averse investors demand to ﬁrms with growing demand
for external funds is higher and ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to expand less their assets.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms invest less and remain smaller in ﬁnancial systems with poor
3institutions because of the lack of risk sharing.
Besides providing an explanation for the real eﬀects of the quality of laws
complementary to the models based on cash ﬂow diversion, the extent of risk
sharing can also explain diﬀerences in the cost of debt which was neglected in the
literature on law and ﬁnance until now.
Most importantly, the empirical implications of the model help to shed light
on the relation between law, ﬁnance and industrial structure. The model predicts
that, ceteris paribus,the ﬁrms with larger optimal scale must pay a higher risk
premium, because they need a larger amount of funds. The empirical evidence
supports this result. Indeed, ﬁrms in sectors where the demand for external funds
is larger appear to be more ﬁnancially constrained in countries where ﬁnancial
markets are less developed and there are less possibilities for risk sharing. In
addition, there is evidence that the possibility of risk diversiﬁcation inﬂuences the
risk premium ﬁrms pay. In fact, the cost of debt is increasing in the absolute
amount of ﬁnancial liabilities of a ﬁrm, even after controlling for ﬁrm leverage
and opaqueness. Not surprisingly, the scale of the loan matters especially in less
ﬁnancially developed countries.
The conclusion that the extent of risk sharing may aﬀect the real activity has
already been reached in diﬀerent contexts. Saint-Paul (1992), Obstfeld (1994) and
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show that the choice of the production function
and the sectorial specialization may well depend on the extent of risk sharing
possible within an economy. If investors can share risk without incurring in high
monitoring costs, highly productive risky technologies are chosen and the economy
growth rate is enhanced. In contrast, if investors cannot share risk, they must
choose a low-productivity safe technology in order to smooth their consumption.
This paper extends this argument by showing that the extent of risk sharing
matters also at the ﬁrm level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 present
the model and show how monitoring costs aﬀect investment behavior. Section 4
and 5 present the empirical evidence and Section 6 concludes.
42. The model
I study a model in which the quality of ﬁnancial laws and the protection of investor
rights by aﬀecting the level of monitoring costs inﬂuences the economy’s risk
sharing and the allocation of capital. Monitoring costs that investors must spend
to appropriate the return to investment aﬀect ﬁrms’ cost of capital, because they
determine ﬁrms’ investor basis. In this respect, the model is very similar to Merton
(1987). However, it endogenizes how the set of ﬁrms which investors actually
fund depends on the quality of investor protection and the ﬁnancial institutions
in a country. This has non-trivial implications because it allows to study the
connection between institutions, risk sharing and investor basis and to make cross-
country predictions on the impact that ﬁrm characteristics, as the demand for
external funds and ﬁrm optimal size, have on the cost of funds.
Moreover, I show that ﬁrms’ eﬀorts to become more visible to potential in-
vestors (such as advertising expenditures) are also inﬂuenced by the quality of
institutions. In countries where investor protection is weaker and risk sharing is
more limited, ﬁrms voluntarily choose to be more opaque and to remain unknown
to most of potential investors.
2.1. Investors
There is a large number, N, of investors, who can be thought as individual in-
vestors who directly fund ﬁrms or as intermediaries. Investors maximizes the
expected utility from their end-of-period wealth, ￿ W1, are identical and can allo-
cate their initial wealth, W0, among ﬁrms’ assets which have a stochastic output
and give a random return, ￿ Ri
1, and a risk free asset with zero return. To ap-
propriate the return from the investment in any ﬁrm i, investors must spend a
ﬁxed cost, τ.2 This may be thought as a monitoring cost that depends on the
2This means that if no monitoring cost is spent, the return to investment is zero.
5level of investor protection and enforcement of law: if institutions do not guar-
antee investor rights eﬀectively, investors have to spend a larger amount of their
resources to appropriate the return to their investment.3 Alternatively, τ may be
interpreted as a cost necessary for gathering and processing information about
the ﬁrms and that is inversely related to the quality of accounting standards in a
country. As in Diamond (1984), monitoring is private and the information that is
produced cannot be observed by outsiders. However, in contrast to in Diamond,
I assume that an unique delegated monitor cannot arise, because the agents who
act as intermediaries are subject to overload.4 To incorporate this eﬀect in the
model in the simplest possible way, I assume that, due to a time constraint, an
intermediary cannot allocate an initial wealth larger than W0.5
















di + W0 − nτ
￿




W0 − nτ, which implies that agents cannot sell the risk free asset. The optimal
portfolio allocation involves choosing how many ﬁrms, n, to ﬁnance and how much
to invest in each ﬁrm i, ki
0.
Investors are risk averse and therefore: U￿ > 0 and U￿￿ < 0.
The portfolio problem is solved by maximizing the expected utility for diﬀerent
values of n and by taking the value that maximizes the expected utility as the
3For instance, laws can make it easier to exercise voting rights for minority shareholders.
4This eﬀect has been studied by Cerasi and Daltung (2000), who assume that the monitoring
costs are increasing in the number of projects monitored by the intermediary and derive an
optimal size of the bank which is bounded.
Alternatively, the intermediary can be thought as a coalition of agents each of whom agrees
to monitor a ﬁrm and agree to share the output with all the remaining investors, as in Ramakr-
ishnan and Thakor (1984). In this case, payoﬀ pooling is ineﬃcient if internal monitoring is
costly.
5Alternatively, I could assume that at least an agent is needed to monitor a ﬁrm and that
each coalition of agents is subject to internal monitoring costs.
6optimal number of ﬁrms funded by each investor (n∗).
If ﬁrms returns are not perfectly correlated, investors could diversify risk by
investing in a large number of ﬁrms. However, ﬁnancing an extra ﬁrm involves a
ﬁxed cost, τ, and, therefore, it may be optimal to fund only a subset of all the
available ﬁrms and bear some diversiﬁable risk. Indeed, the empirical evidence,
available especially for the US, shows that households hold stocks of very few ﬁrms
in their portfolios (Guiso et al., 2000). This seems to be true to a diﬀerent extent
also for ﬁnancial intermediaries as there is empirical evidence showing that US
investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally-headquartered ﬁrms
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999).
Investors may be thought to own shares and to appropriate of a fraction of
the output proportional to their investment. It will be made clear later that the
results would hold with any other form of ﬁnancing, as long as the return depends
on the state of the world. In particular, investors could ﬁnance ﬁrms with debt.
If there is a positive probability of ﬁrm default, results are unchanged.
2.2. Firms
There is a large number of ﬁrms, M, which diﬀer in their technologies. Tech-
nologies, in turn, are distinguished by the probability distribution of total factor
productivity. I assume that there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types, with a large
number of ﬁrms of each type. The total factor productivity is identically and
independently distributed across ﬁrms of the same type and is also independently
(but not identically) distributed across ﬁrms of diﬀerent types. These assump-
tions are central to the model because they guarantee that, as the number of
ﬁrms of each type goes to inﬁnity, agents could diversify all the risk by investing
in diﬀerent ﬁrms.6 They are also well supported by the empirical evidence which
shows that corporate growth rates are idiosyncratic (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992;
6For the results of the model to hold I just need that the productivity shocks are not perfectly
correlated across ﬁrms. The assumption that the shocks are independently distributed is done
only for computational simplicity.
7Geroski, 1999). In fact, the evidence on tendency towards common growth rates
across ﬁrms in the same industry is very weak and macroeconomic variables are
not very useful to explain individual ﬁrms growth rates. It is, therefore, common
to assume that ﬁrm speciﬁc uncertainty dominates ﬁrm level dynamics (see, for
instance, Hopenhayn, 1992).
The production function of ﬁrm i is:
￿ X
i






where the random variable, ￿ Ai
1, is the total factor productivity of ﬁrm i, Ki
0
is the capital invested in ﬁrm i at t =0and α is a technological parameter. The
output, ￿ Xi
1, which is realized at t =1depends on the capital invested at t =0and
on the realization of the random productivity shock, which is unknown at t =0 .
Firms produce an homogeneous output and, since there are decreasing returns
to scale, several ﬁrms can operate in equilibrium.
In what follows, I will abstract from the possibility that ﬁrms can merge. This
is equivalent to say that the above production function represents ﬁrms after all
the incentives for corporate ”internal” diversiﬁcation have been exploited. Indeed,
corporate diversiﬁcation is unlikely to substitute ﬁnancial markets, because there
is evidence that the potential beneﬁts are often oﬀset by the costs due to agency
problems and power struggles among divisions within the conglomerate (Rajan,
Servaes and Zingales, 2000).
Firms are run by managers who maximize expected proﬁts less investment
expenditures. Managers can also exercise eﬀort mi to increase a ﬁrm’s visibility
to potential investors by trying, for instance, to advertise the ﬁrm in ﬁnancial
newspapers. This advertising eﬀort involves a cost in terms of the output, c(mi),
for the manager, but can decrease the cost of funds, ￿ Ri
1, since more visibility can
increase a ﬁrm investor basis. I assume that the relation between advertising eﬀort
and the actual number of investor of a ﬁrm i, νi, is the following. The number
of potential ﬁnanciers in the market is Nn∗ (i.e. the number of investors times




k mkNn∗ (or the closest integer). This means that ﬁrm i will get
a number of ﬁnanciers that is proportional to the share of its advertising eﬀort
relative to the ones of all the ﬁrms which ask for funds.
The ﬁrm manager chooses how much eﬀort to exercise to make the ﬁrm visible
to potential investors and the amount of capital to be employed in the ﬁrm, Ki
0.


















I assume that the cost of eﬀorts c(mi) is increasing and convex. Therefore,
c￿(mi) > 0 and c￿￿(mi) > 0.
Before taking investment decisions, managers know only the distribution of
total factor productivity, but not the realization of ￿ Ai
1. They appropriate the
proﬁts net of ﬁnancing and eﬀort costs. For simplicity sake, I assume that they
have no initial wealth. I will analyze later the implications of internal funds
accumulation.
2.3. The equilibrium
To summarize, agents choose simultaneously the following quantities:
• Managers choose the eﬀort to exercise to make their ﬁrm visible taking the
aggregate eﬀort,
￿
k mk, as given and make investment decisions
• Investors choose in how many and which ﬁrms to invest and make portfolio
decisions
An equilibrium of the above economy is an allocation and equilibrium returns
that satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. Investors maximize utility taking the return to investment and other in-
vestors’ decisions as given.
92. After learning the expected value of its total factor productivity (but before
knowing its actual value), the manager of ﬁrm i maximizes the expected









0 and ￿ Ri
1 (Ki
0) solve the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem.
3. Managers optimally choose the eﬀort to exercise to make their ﬁrm visible
taking the aggregate eﬀort,
￿
k mk, as given




5. Demand of capital is equal to supply of capital for all ﬁrms of all types.
This implies that the investment of the νi ﬁnanciers of ﬁrm i is equal to the
aggregate investment in ﬁrm i : νiki
0 = Ki
0.
6. Investors are willing to fund a total number of ﬁrms which is equal to the
total number of ﬁrm ﬁnanciers: Nn∗ =
￿
i νi
I study a symmetric equilibrium in which investors hold the same portfolios.
From the assumptions of the model it also follows that ﬁrms with the same tech-
nological characteristics invest in the same amount and their managers exert the
same eﬀort.
A symmetric equilibrium exists if the following condition holds.
Remark 1. Existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Deﬁne Mk the number
of ﬁrms of type k. In an equilibrium in which investors have a symmetric portfolio
the following condition must be satisﬁed: νkMk = aN, where a can be any integer
greater than zero. This condition implies that each investor must be able to invest
in the same number a of ﬁrms of type k.
Note that such a condition can always be satisﬁed if the number of ﬁrms of
type k that enter in equilibrium is endogenized. However, here I disregard entry
10and assume that all the M ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive and receive a positive
amount of external funds in equilibrium.
3. Equilibrium implications
3.1. Zero Monitoring Costs
If τ were equal to zero, investors would invest in each ﬁrm at least a small amount
of their wealth (i.e. n∗ = M) In this case, if there is a large enough number of
ﬁrms of each type, Mk →∞, risk can be perfectly diversiﬁed and the allocation
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is the allocation of capital that solves the problem of maximiza-
tion of the expected output.
In what follows I will refer to Ki∗
0 as the optimal scale of a ﬁrm of type i.7
3.2. Positive Monitoring Costs
This section analyzes the properties of the equilibrium allocation with positive
monitoring costs and shows that the level of monitoring costs inﬂuences ﬁrm size
and the cost of funds.
To solve the model I ﬁrst study the equilibrium in the market for funds for
given νi and n∗ and then I analyze how their optimal value is inﬂuenced by the
level of monitoring costs.
For any given value of n, the ﬁrst order conditions of agents portfolio decisions
are:
7Notice that this model, like Lucas (1978), predicts that, ceteris paribus, average ﬁrm size is











− λ = 0. (3.1)






1 − 1)+W0 −nτ
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0di ≤ W0 − nτ. As usual, λ>0 only if the constraint is
binding.
Since ﬁnancing a ﬁrm involves a ﬁxed cost, investors may ﬁnd it optimal to
fund only a subset of the available ﬁrms.
















The equilibrium risk premium for investing in any ﬁrm i depends on the covari-
ance between the marginal utility of the ﬁnal wealth and the return to investment
of this ﬁrm, which is obviously negative under my assumptions on ￿ A1. The ab-
solute value of the covariance depends on the size of the investment in the ﬁrm:
the larger this is, the more the return of ﬁrm i is correlated with the ﬁnal wealth.
This is proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Risk premium and investment size). The equilibrium risk
premium of ﬁrm i increases in the size of the investment of each investor in ﬁrm
i.
Proof. See appendix.
It is important to note that Proposition 3.1 does not depends on any particular
form of ﬁnancing. Although the most direct interpretation is that investors fund
ﬁrms with equity and that the lack of risk sharing inﬂuences the equity premium,
all the results would go through if ﬁrms issued debt and had a positive probability
of default. In fact, also in this case the covariance between the return to investment
12and the ﬁnal wealth would be positive and the cost of external funds would depend
on the ﬁrm’s investor basis.
The demand for funds is derived from the proﬁt maximization ﬁrst order con-
ditions.Firm managers maximize proﬁts and take into account the eﬀect of of size
of the investment on the risk premium. The proﬁt maximizing conditions implies
that, from the point of view of the investors, a ﬁrm return depends negatively
on aggregate investment in ﬁrm i, Ki
0. The ﬁrst order condition for the optimal









































The continuity between 1 +
λ
U
￿(W 1) and inﬁnity of the expected return in the





, guarantees the existence of an equilib-
rium. In fact, taking the choices of other investors as given, the demand for funds




while the supply of funds is monotonic increasing, as has been shown in the ap-
pendix. Therefore, an intersection point can always be found for any combination
of individual choices.
In the proof of Proposition 3.1 it has been shown that the linearized form of





















Equation 3.4 is the upward sloping supply for funds of ﬁrm i, for a given
number νi of ﬁnanciers. From equation 3.3, it is obvious that the eﬀect of an
increase in the number of ﬁnanciers, νi, is to decrease the demand for funds to
each investor and therefore has the eﬀect of decreasing the ﬁrm’s cost of funds.









Therefore, the equilibrium ultimately depends on νi, which in turn is deter-
mined by managers advertising eﬀorts, mi, and the optimal number of assets in
investors portfolios, n∗.
When making portfolio decisions, investors choose the number and which ﬁrms
they wish to fund, n∗, in order to maximize their expected utility. Their choice
depends on the level of monitoring costs, as is proved in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 (Monitoring costs and the size of investment). If moni-
toring costs, τ, decrease, the risk premium decreases for all the ﬁrm types, if
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing in the level of ﬁnal wealth.
Furthermore, it may become optimal for consumers to ﬁnance a larger number of
ﬁrms. In this case, the equilibrium cost of capital decreases under more general
conditions.
Proof. A decrease in the level of monitoring costs can determine two possible
eﬀects. First of all, there is always a wealth eﬀect. When monitoring costs de-
crease, a larger amount of the initial wealth can be invested in the ﬁrms which are
currently funded. The eﬀect of this is to decrease the equilibrium risk premium




This follows from the linearized form of the supply of capital to ﬁrm i (equation
3.4). In fact, for given demand of capital by ﬁrm i, the equilibrium investment
increases as long as the slope of the supply of capital decreases. Under the above
condition, the equilibrium rate of return decreases for all ﬁrms.
However, also another eﬀect can be at work. If τ decreases the cost of investing
in an additional ﬁrm goes down and, therefore, it may be optimal to increase the
number of ﬁrms that are ﬁnanced. This improves the diversiﬁcation of the portfolio
(diversiﬁcation eﬀect) of each investors, because the demand for funds by ﬁrm i to
each investor decreases. This decreases the risk premium ﬁrms pay in equilibrium
on external funds under the more general condition that the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion does not increase too fast in the individual wealth, if λ = 0 (i.e. a
14positive amount of wealth is invested in the risk free asset). However, if λ>0,
the marginal utility of wealth may increase and the increase in the intercept of
equation 3.4 could counteract the decrease in the slope.
Finally, the way in which potential ﬁnanciers are shared among the existing
ﬁrms depends on managers eﬀort choices. Managers decide how much eﬀort to
exercise to advertise the ﬁrm among potential investors. To do so, they take
into account that investors buy at most Nn∗ shares and that mi aﬀect the risk
premium through the number of ﬁnanciers.
The ﬁrst order condition that determine the optimal level of expenditures in
































k mk − c
￿(m
i) ￿ 08 (3.5)
From the inspection of equation 3.5 and the convexity of c(mi), Proposition
3.3 follows.
Proposition 3.3 (Firm investor basis). In ﬁrms that invest more, managers
exercise more eﬀort to acquire visibility and therefore have a larger investor ba-
sis. However they also demand a large amount of funds to each single investor
and therefore pay a larger risk premium. Moreover, when investors demand for
8The level of expenses must be such that νi is an integer. If when the ﬁrst order condition is
satisﬁed with the equality mi
￿
k mkNn∗ is not an integer, the number that makes it equal to the
closest smaller integer is taken.
15ﬁnancial assets is low (Nn∗ low), it is optimal for ﬁrms to remain more opaque,
as the optimal level of eﬀort is lower.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms with larger demand for capital ask for more funds to any
single investor, especially in countries where the monitoring costs are higher ( and
therefore n∗ is low). Therefore, after controlling for the variability of returns, in
equilibrium, ﬁrms with higher expected total factor productivity must provide a
higher return to investment, because their demand for capital to each investor is
larger for any level of the interest rate. Moreover, this risk premium is increasing
in the level of monitoring costs.
Given the initial distribution of ﬁrms’ technological characteristics, in countries
where the sources of funds are more concentrated, ﬁrms with high expected total
factor productivity invest less and therefore remain smaller.
From a dynamic point of view, ﬁrms that thanks to exogenous productivity
improvements have positive growth opportunities but lack of internal funds react
diﬀerently depending on their investor basis. The smaller this is, the more the
risk premium increases when ﬁrms demand more external funds. In equilibrium,
given a positive productivity shock, ﬁrms will expand less their assets in countries
where the monitoring costs are larger.
For given technological conditions the model has also some implications for
ﬁrm size distribution. Since high productivity ﬁrms that would have larger optimal
scale are relatively more ﬁnancially constrained in equilibrium in countries where
monitoring costs are higher, the variance of the ﬁrm size distribution is expected
to be smaller. However, if entry is considered, the implications of the model for
ﬁrm size distribution become ambiguous. In fact, the model implies that for high
values of the monitoring costs, it may not be optimal to fund ﬁrms whose optimal
scale is very small. As a consequence, the lower are monitoring costs, the more
ﬁrms with small optimal scale are expected to enter. Although in principle the
eﬀect of monitoring costs on cross-country average ﬁrm size may be ambiguous,
Kumar et al. (1999) suggest that constraints that poor protection of investor
16rights imposes to ﬁrms with large optimal scale prevail on the eﬀects of entry.
The model could be generalized to account that the eﬀort costs of increasing a





also on a parameter λ
i, which proxies for the access of the ﬁrm management to
the media or to ﬁnancial institutions in such a way that cλi < 0 and cmiλi < 0.9
Better access to the media or to ﬁnancial institutions reduce the marginal cost
of acquiring visibility and allows ﬁrms to increase more their investor basis. This
implies that there may be equilibria in which ﬁrms with the same distribution
of total factor productivity have a diﬀerent number of ﬁnanciers. In particular,
a few ﬁrms may be allowed to invest more at lower cost, because of their larger
investor basis, although they are not more productive. In this case, large ﬁrms
which to some extent overinvest may coexist with smaller ﬁnancing constrained
ﬁrms. If there is a small number of ﬁrms (x<n ∗) with easier access to media
that succeed in receiving funds by all the N investors, the remaining ﬁrms have




M−x in this case
￿
and therefore are
even more ﬁnancially constrained.
The existence of these large ﬁrms makes the distortion described in this paper
even more relevant when one studies the determinants of the cost of funds and
of ﬁnancial constraints for small and medium size enterprises with low level of
visibility. This is what I will do in the empirical analysis which relies on a sample
of mostly private companies.
3.3. Dynamic implications
Until this point, I have considered a static model and did not allow managers
to reinvest proﬁts. However, if a stage is added to the model and risk neutral
managers can reinvest the internal funds generated by the ﬁrst period proﬁts πi
1,
ﬁrms with the same expected productivity and investor basis can diﬀer in the
9Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and Shleifer (2001) show that such a situation may be very
relevant, as private families who own the largest industrial ﬁrms own often also the media.
17amount of funds they demand to outside investors.
For simplicity, I assume that ﬁrms’ investor basis remains equal and that
the distribution of total factor productivity is invariant and independent across
periods.
The optimal demand for external funds by ﬁrm i in period 1 is now Ki
1−πi
1.O f
course, this implies that ﬁrms that have a positive productivity shock at t = 1 have
lower cost of funds and can increase investment. Proposition 3.4 shows that ﬁrms
with higher expected productivity have higher cash-ﬂow sensitivity of investment.
Proposition 3.4 (Cash-ﬂow sensitivity and optimal ﬁrm size). Firms with
higher expected total factor productivity and therefore larger optimal size increase







































































































































0 decreases the right hand side of the above equation. The equality




1 would imply a contradiction.
18For given level of the expected productivity therefore ﬁrms that had a pos-
itive productivity shock invest more and this generates cash-ﬂow sensitivity of
investment. Investment increases for two reasons:
1. The demand for external funds is lower and for given investor basis this
decreases the risk premium and therefore the cost of funds.
2. The opportunity cost of internal funds for the risk neutral ﬁrm manager is
equal to the risk free asset return.10
Most importantly, the impact of internal funds on investment diﬀers across
ﬁrms. In fact, it is larger for ﬁrms with larger optimal scale, which are initially
more ﬁnancially constrained. Moreover, it is larger for ﬁrms with smaller investor
basis and therefore in countries where there are less possibilities for risk sharing.
4. Empirical Implications
This section examines the empirical implications of the model and contrasts them
with the empirical evidence provided by the existing literature.
In the model, because of the monitoring costs, households (or intermediaries)
expose themselves to substantial diversiﬁable risk by ﬁnancing only a small num-
ber of ﬁrms. Although there are no thorough cross-country comparisons of house-
holds’ portfolio decisions because of the lack of comparable data, there is extensive
evidence that weak protection of investor rights has an impact on the supply of
funds and markets capitalization (La Porta et al., 1998), which is obviously very
important for sharing business risk.
The counterpart of the lack of portfolio diversiﬁcation in countries where the
rules of law are weaker is the small investor basis of ﬁrms. Indeed, Himmelberg et
10There is indeed empirical evidence that entrepreneurs have a lower opportunity cost of funds
in investing their private wealth in their own business (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2001).
This could be given to lower risk aversion (as I assume here) or to the fact that they enjoy
private beneﬁts from running their own business.
19al. (2000) show that the weaker is legal protection, the more likely is to observe
concentrated inside equity ownership of ﬁrms. Moreover, since in countries where
investor protection is poor the bond markets are also underdeveloped, ﬁrms have
limited scope to enlarge their investor basis through the emission of bonds. How-
ever, there is evidence that ﬁrms try to increase their investor basis by increasing
the number of bank relationships in countries where investor protection is weaker
and the enforcement of law is poorer (Ongena and Smith, 2000). Anyway, the
extent of risk sharing and, more in general, the availability of external funds that
ﬁrms manage to achieve is likely to remain suboptimal, since several studies ﬁnd
signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁnancial and institutional development on ﬁrm size, credit
availability and the cost of funds. In fact, there is evidence that a lower protection
of investor rights decreases corporate valuation and, therefore, increases the cost
of external funds (La Porta et al., 1999). Furthermore, investor protection and the
enforcement of law have a signiﬁcant impact on average ﬁrm size (Kumar Rajan
and Zingales, 1999).
Although the previous studies provide indirect empirical evidence compatible
with the model, they are compatible also with alternative explanations. They are
compatible for instance with Wolfenzon and Shleifer (2000), who show that in
countries where outside shareholders are less protected by the laws and diversion
problems are more severe, ﬁrm size should be smaller, because less funds can be
raised through the stock market.11
In general, theories based on diﬀerent ﬁnancial imperfections have similar im-
plications: ﬁnancial imperfections make more diﬃcult to raise funds and, as a
consequence, ﬁrms remain smaller in less developed ﬁnancial markets. However,
the model presented in this paper allows to make more detailed empirical pre-
dictions on which categories of ﬁrms are likely to be more ﬁnancially constrained
and to pay a higher risk premium in equilibrium, if the lack of risk sharing plays
11Himmelberg et al. (2000), indeed, ﬁnd that ﬁrms seem to be more ﬁnancially constrained in
countries where the ownership is more concentrated. Moreover, Love (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁnancing
constraints are more stringent in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
20a signiﬁcant role in capital allocation.
On average, ﬁrms with larger demand for external capital are expected to be
relatively more ﬁnancially constrained in ﬁnancial markets where investor rights
are less protected if the lack of risk sharing is important. In fact, the covari-
ance between the marginal utility of consumption and the return to investment
increases in absolute value if the demand for funds goes up and consequently the
equilibrium risk premium is higher. This is the more so, the fewer are the investors
which fund a ﬁrm in equilibrium.
In conclusion, the absolute amount of external funds that ﬁrms demand is
important here and not the share of capital that is retained by the ﬁrm manager,
like in ”diversion” models. Moreover, while the models based on diversion concern
equity ﬁnancing only, the implications of this model hold also for debt.
The following section illustrates an empirical strategy to evaluate whether the
implications of the model are corroborated by the data.
5. Empirical evidence
The importance of risk sharing for ﬁrms’ cost of external funds and investment
behavior may be diﬃcult to evaluate. In fact, if advertising costs are heteroge-
neous, because, for instance, ﬁrms have diﬀerential access to media, there may be
ﬁrms with a large investor basis and access to funds at low cost, even in countries
where monitoring costs are high,. In order to have a sample of ﬁrms which is as
homogeneous as possible in this respect, I rely on a sample of mostly private ﬁrms,
which excludes the largest public companies in a country and, therefore, are likely
to have the same possibilities to be visible. Moreover, these ﬁrms are unlikely to
be able to recur to the international capital markets and therefore for them the
imperfections of the domestic ﬁnancial markets should be more important.
In what follows, I evaluate whether the amount of the funds ﬁrms demand to
external ﬁnanciers (both investors and intermediaries) has an impact on the cost
of external funds and ﬁnancing constraints. I also compare how the impact diﬀers
21across ﬁnancial systems according to the possibilities of risk sharing they oﬀer.
The ﬁrm level data and the aggregate proxies, which measure the possibilities
of risk sharing in an economy, are described below.
5.1. Data
Information on individual ﬁrms is taken from the Amadeus (Analyze Major Data-
base from European Sources) Database by Bureau Van Dijk.
Amadeus provides balance sheet information for ﬁrms having minimal size
requirements (sales greater than ten millions of Euros, more than 150 employees
or total assets greater than 10 millions of Euros) beginning from 1993 to 1998 for
31 European countries. The sample collects information on about 225.000 ﬁrms.
The panel, however, is very unbalanced and there are many missing observations.
Therefore, I restrict the analysis to 11 European countries for which there is at
least information on ﬁxed assets and value added and the time dimension for the
individual ﬁrms is suﬃciently long to allow the estimation of investment equations,
needed to have a measure of ﬁnancing constraints. These are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the UK.12
Although this data set allow to test the model with a large number of ﬁrms,
there are some limitations. First of all, I cannot distinguish between bank loans
and bonds and, since I have only balance sheet data, I have no information on bank
relationships and the number of ﬁnancing banks. Second, since the companies are
mostly non-listed, I have only book values and the price of shares is obviously
not available. Notwithstanding these limitations, I believe that this data set can
provide precious information on private companies’ behavior.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 provide some descriptive statistics on ﬁrm characteristics by
country of incorporation and on the variables I use in the empirical analysis.
12For a more detailed description of the dataset, see Giannetti (2000).
22Table 5.1: Number of employees by country
The statistics are calculated using all the ﬁrms included in data set in 1994.
# Firms Median # Employees Standard Deviation
Austria 183 341 5062
Belgium 5328 47 1090
Finland 1269 71 461
France 9814 80 2516
Germany 2173 435 11965
Ireland 559 131 1327
Italy 11205 65 1166
Netherlands 5489 125 625
Portugal 476 125 1218
Spain 16 124 235
UK 19337 136 4867
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
The variables are deﬁned as follows. The cost of debt is the ratio of the ﬁnancial
expenditures to the outstanding ﬁnancial liabilities. The variable ASY is the ratio of
intangible assets to total assets, LEV is a ﬁrm’s leverage, Debt is the logarithm of the
ﬁnancial liabilities expressed in EUROS, and ROA is the return on assets. All the
statistics are calculated for 1994.
Median Standard Deviation # Obs.
Cost of Debt 0.05 89.41 74416
ASY 0.04 1.02 41672
ROA 0.03 67.28 85549
LEV 0.72 0.83 84780
Debt 8.59 2.89 84309
23Firms’ balance sheet data are matched with information on the opportunities
of risk sharing available in each country. These are in principle diﬃcult to measure.
In fact, as Allen and Gale (1995) argue, both market and intermediaries provide
opportunities for risk sharing and these are often complementary. To measure
the opportunities to share idiosyncratic risk at time t, I focus on three measures.
These are the capitalizations of the stock and the bond markets to GDP and the
share of the three largest banks in the credit market which proxies for the size of
ﬁnancial institutions.
From Table 5.3, it is evident that in my sample diﬀerent proxies for risk sharing
do not create any ambiguity, since according to all the indicators the countries
that allow for more risk sharing, because they have more capitalized ﬁnancial
markets or larger ﬁnancial institutions, are the Netherlands and the UK. In fact,
the Netherlands and the UK not only have very developed and well-capitalized
ﬁnancial markets, but have also higher bank concentration as measured by the
sum of the credit market shares of the three largest banks.
5.2. The cost of debt
To evaluate the impact of ﬁnancial markets on the cost of capital, one should
ideally have a measure of the cost of all the sources of external ﬁnance (that is, the
interest rate ﬁrms pay on debt and the underpricing in the issues of new capital).
This comprehends both the issues of new shares and debt. However, in my data
set the most of ﬁrms are unlisted and there is no measure of underpricing to
determine the cost of the issues of new shares. Therefore, I will focus on the cost
of debt, which in any case is likely to be the most important source of external
funds for a sample of mostly unlisted ﬁrms.13 Using balance sheet data, the cost
of debt can be easily calculated as the ratio of ﬁnancial expenditures to total debt.
13However, there is evidence that size has a signiﬁcant impact on corporate valuation and
that this diﬀers across countries. Lins and Servaes (1999) ﬁnd a negative correlation between
size and ﬁrm valuation in Germany, but not in Japan and UK. Since Japan and UK have deeper
ﬁnancial markets than Germany and, therefore, oﬀer better opportunities for risk sharing, this
ﬁnding indirectly supports the results of the model.
24Table 5.3: Institutional Variables
The stock (bond) market capitalization is the ratio of the stock (bond) market capital-
ization to GDP. Bank concentration has been measure by the market share of the three
largest banks. All data refer to 1996, end of the year data. Sources: Rajan and Zingales
(1999) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2000).
Stock Market Bond Market Bank
Capitalization Capitalization Concentration
Austria 0.19 0.16 0.42
Belgium 0.46 0.01 0.49
Finland 0.08 0.56 0.85
France 0.39 0.11 0.28
Germany 0.35 0.59 0.27
Ireland 0.49 NA NA
Italy 0.21 0.03 0.24
Netherlands 0.99 0.35 0.77
Portugal 0.23 0.06 0.46
Spain 0.43 0.02 0.34
UK 1.31 0.22 0.5
25Equation 3.4 predicts that the risk premium increases in the amount of funds
provided by a single investor, which is not observed in the data. However, if ﬁrms
within a country have a homogeneous investor basis, this can be substituted with
the total amount of ﬁnancial liabilities in a ﬁrm balance sheet. In countries where
investor basis is more limited because of weak institutions, a larger amount of debt
is expected to increase its cost, even after controlling for ﬁrms characteristics which
proxy for the probability of bankruptcy, the extent of asymmetric information
problems and the variability and the procyclality of returns. To test whether this
implication of the model holds, I estimate an equation where the cost of debt
depends on the amount of the outstanding loans (DEBT), and other variables
which control for alternative determinants of the cost of debt.14 The control
variables I include are the variability of returns in the sector and the country of
ﬁrm i (SROA), which is a measure of ﬁrm risk, the ratio of intangible assets to
ﬁxed assets (ASY), which is inversely related to the availability of collateral, and
the leverage (LEV). The leverage has been included to control that the positive
partial correlation between cost of debt and total debt is not spuriously due to the
fact that ﬁrms with larger outstanding loans are also more levered and, therefore,
have higher probability of default that would obviously make their risk premium
larger. Since high leverage is correlated with ﬁrm defaults only if it is above a
certain threshold, I also included a quadratic term for leverage in the equation
(LEVSQ). Finally, I included countries ﬁxed eﬀects to control for cross-country
diﬀerences in the interest rate and 19 sectorial dummies which pick up diﬀerences
in the cost of funds due diﬀerences in systematic risk across sectors.
All the variables with the exception of leverage and the dummy variables have
been taken in logarithms. Extreme observations have been excluded and only
ﬁrms with cost of debt greater than the ﬁfth and lower than the ninety ﬁfth
percentile have been included.
14This exercise is equivalent to the structural estimation of the logarithm of equation 3.4. The
only diﬀerence is that in the estimated equation the regressor is the aggregate level of debt ( a
proxy of Ki) not the investment of each investor
￿
ki￿
. Therefore, the estimated coeﬃcient is
expected to be positive, but smaller than 1.
26Table 5.4: The Cost of Debt
The dependent variable is deﬁned as the ratio of the ﬁnancial expenditures to the
outstanding debt. The variable ASY is the ratio of intangible assets to the total ﬁxed
assets, LEV is a ﬁrm’s leverage deﬁned as ﬁnancial debt to total liabilities, LEVSQ is the
square of ﬁrm leverage, Debt is the amount of ﬁnancial liabilities of the ﬁrm and SROA
is the standard deviation of a ﬁrm return on assets. The dummy ”High Risk Sharing”
is equal to 1 for the UK and the Netherlands and equal to zero for the remaining
countries. Country and sectorial ﬁxed eﬀects and a dummy for listed companies have
been introduced to control for diﬀerences in the cost of funds. Estimates are obtained

























Debt*High Risk sharing 0.04
(−6.55)∗∗∗ −0.041
(−1.98)∗∗
No. Firms 61156 61156 49747
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
The equation has been estimated using a between estimator that uses individ-
ual averages of the variables and ordinary least squares. Since the results were
qualitatively invariant, only the estimates obtained with the between estimator
are presented.
Results are presented in Table 5.4 and are overall supportive of the conclusions
of the model.
Indeed, the cost of debt increases in the amount of outstanding loans. More-
over, if I distinguish the eﬀects of larger demand for loans across countries with
27diﬀerent possibility of risk sharing (Table 5.4, Column 2), I ﬁnd that higher out-
standing debt has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the cost of funds especially
in countries with less developed ﬁnancial systems. In fact the coeﬃcient of the
variable DEBT interacted with the dummy HIGH RISK SHARING OPPORTU-
NITIES (which is equal to 1 for the Netherlands and the UK) is negative and
signiﬁcant. This implies that higher dependence on debt increases less the cost
of debt in countries where ﬁnancial markets are more developed. As one would
expect, higher variability of returns increases the cost of funds. More surprisingly,
ﬁrms that lack of collateral have lower cost of debt. Since, as I show later, these
ﬁrms are also likely to be more ﬁnancially constrained, this could be interpreted
as evidence of credit rationing. As expected, the cost of debt is higher for more
levered ﬁrms and the quadratic term is always positive and signiﬁcant. Finally,
the country and sectorial dummies were mostly signiﬁcant.
In alternative speciﬁcations (not reported), I also control for the ratio of earn-
ings before interest and taxes to interest expense (EBIT), which is a proxy of
the probability of ﬁnancial distress. As one would expect, a higher value of the
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense decreases the cost
of debt. Most importantly, the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the variables of
interest remain qualitatively invariant.
The sign and the signiﬁcance of the control variables remain unchanged when
the variables of interest (DEBT and the interaction are omitted) and the impact of
the variables of interest remain qualitatively unchanged in diﬀerent speciﬁcation
of the equation which in turn have excluded the sectorial dummies and some of
the control variables.
As a further robustness check, I estimate the equation for ﬁrms with highly
concentrated ownership (ﬁrst shareholder share larger than 75%) and low con-
centrated ownership (ﬁrst shareholder share less than 10%) separately. While all
the results hold for ﬁrms with highly concentrated ownership, the impact of the
variable DEBT on the cost of funds is not signiﬁcant for the ﬁrms with more
dispersed ownership. These ﬁrms are likely to have a larger share of market debt
28and therefore more debtholders and are more able to distribute risk among many
investors. I also tried to include the share of the ﬁrst shareholder among the re-
gressors, but the coeﬃcient was always insigniﬁcant and did not aﬀect the other
estimates.
Finally, I checked for eventual endogeneity problems of the variable debt using
a ﬁrm’s employment as instrumental variable and the results were qualitatively
unchanged (Table 5.4, Column 3).
5.3. The determinants of ﬁnancing constraints
This Section implements a further test of the importance of risk sharing for in-
vestment decisions by looking at cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial constraints.
Firms with similar investor basis whose demand for external funds is larger
should be more ﬁnancially constrained in countries where there are less opportuni-
ties for risk sharing. It is so because the cost of funds is expected to increase faster
with the amount of external funds demanded. Since larger optimal scale involves
higher need for external funds for young ﬁrms which had no time to accumulate
internal resources, another testable implication of the model is that ﬁnancing con-
straints are expected to be more severe in sectors where ﬁrms’ optimal scale is
larger.
To test the empirical relevance of this implication of the model I need a proxy
for the extent of ﬁnancing constraints and for the optimal ﬁrm size, which diﬀers
from the actual size because the latter is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the
ﬁnancial system and other distortions due to institutions and resource constraints.
I proxy the optimal ﬁrm size by using the data on average ﬁrm size by sec-
tor taken from the Eurostat’ Small and Medium Enterprises database. Size is
measured by the number of employees. Notwithstanding these data are based on
European ﬁrms and, therefore, are inﬂuenced by distortions, they provide a proxy
for cross-sector diﬀerences in optimal ﬁrm size. This helps to evaluate the need
for risk sharing of ﬁrms in diﬀerent sectors and provides a measure of the demand
for risk sharing in a given sector, coherent with the model.
29To measure the extent of ﬁnancing constraints is a more challenging task. The
investment literature suggests that the excess sensitivity of investment to internal
sources of funds can be interpreted as evidence of ﬁnancing constraints (Hubbard,
1998). This is also compatible with the two-period extension of the model.
Therefore, to have an estimate of the extent of ﬁnancing constraints across
countries in accordance with ﬁrms’ need for risk sharing, I group ﬁrms in 19
sectors per country and, afterwards, I estimate the following investment equation
using the generalized method of moments:15
It+1i
Kt+1i












where Iti is the investment at time t of ﬁrm i, Kti is the total stock of capital,
Xti is the output and εti is a random noise.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcient β3 is interpreted as a measure of the extent
of ﬁnancing constraints in accordance to the previous literature. Since the ratio
of a ﬁrm value added to total capital is a measure of productivity at time t,i fi ti s





, in the absence of ﬁnancing constraints,





. Therefore, ￿ β3 should be negative.
However, this variable is positively correlated also with proﬁtability and cash
ﬂow.16 If ﬁrms do not have access to external ﬁnance or if its cost increases in
the amount of external funds demanded, the estimate of the coeﬃcient ￿ β3 may be
positive.
Table 5.5 summarizes a few descriptive statistics about ￿ β3.
To investigate the determinants of ﬁnancing constraints, I regress ￿ β3 on vari-
15See Bond and Meghir (1994) for details on the estimation method and the interpretation
of coeﬃcients. The previous equation can be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁrm
intertemporal proﬁt maximization under the assumption that it is costly to adjust investment.
The model presented in this paper can be easily extended to incorporate these assumptions
without any changes in the qualitative results.
16In the dataset the correlation coeﬃcient between value added and cash ﬂow is larger tha 99
percent.
30Table 5.5: Financing constraints: descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
￿ β3 141 -0.037 1.47 -13.86 4.46
ables which measure the extent of information asymmetries, which are often con-
sidered a source of ﬁnancing constraints, the need of risk sharing in a given sector
and the supply of risk sharing in a given country.
The supply of risk sharing has been measured by the level of stock market
capitalization to GDP. This variable has been interacted with the proxy of optimal
ﬁrm size in the sector of ﬁrm i, in order to check if data show a diﬀerential impact
of an increase in ﬁnancial development on ﬁnancing constraints across sectors
according to their need of risk sharing. I also controlled for the level of asymmetric
information in a given sector measured by the median of the ratio of intangible
assets to ﬁxed assets in that sector in a given country.
Results are reported in Table 5.6.
There is a positive, but non signiﬁcant impact of information asymmetries
on ﬁnancing constraints, measured by ￿ β3. Firms seem to be more ﬁnancially
constrained in sectors and in countries where the median level of employees is
larger, but the evidence is weak as the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 5% only if
the proxy for the extent of information asymmetries is not included.17 More
interestingly, the coeﬃcient of the interaction variable is negative and signiﬁcant:
ﬁnancial development seem to mitigate ﬁnancing constraints more in sectors where
ﬁrm size is larger. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish across sectors to
identify signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁnancial development, as the model predicts. In
fact, the level of stock market capitalization to GDP is not signiﬁcant if it is not
interacted with the average ﬁrm size in the sector which measure the demand for
17The positive relation between actual ﬁrm size and the measure of ﬁnancial constraints could
also depend on imperfect competition in the product market. See Bond and Meghir (1994) for
details.
31Table 5.6: The Determinants of Financing Constraints
The dependent variable is the estimated value of the coeﬃcient of value added, ￿ β3,i n
the investment equation estimated by sector and by country. In columns 2 and 3 the
risk sharing opportunities are proxied by the stock market capitalization to GDP. SROA
is the standard deviation of the return on assets.
(1) (2) (3)





























Obs. 127 127 114
R2 0.03 0.09 0.06
risk sharing.
I also controlled for the sectorial variability of returns, but the coeﬃcient
(estimates not reported) was always not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and the
estimate of the coeﬃcient of the variable of interest was not aﬀected.
One of the strongest critiques to this approach is that the current level of cash
ﬂow can be correlated with future growth opportunities and therefore the positive
correlation between cash ﬂow and investment might depend on reasons which are
completely diﬀerent from ﬁnancing constraints. To check the robustness of the
results, ideally one should control for the market valuation of the assets of a ﬁrm.
Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide this information since it relies mostly
on private ﬁrms. Therefore I control for the intertemporal correlation of ﬁrm
return on assets within a sector: if the current productivity is a good predictor
of future productivity, the intertemporal correlation of return on assets should
be high. The coeﬃcient of this variable although positive is not signiﬁcantly
32diﬀerent from zero. Most importantly, its inclusion does not change the sign and
the signiﬁcance of the variable of interest.
Finally, since it is controversial to interpret the actual magnitude of the co-
eﬃcient ￿ β3 as a measure of the severity of ﬁnancing constraints ( see Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997), but one can deﬁnitively interpret its sign I substituted the
dependent variable of the above regressions with ￿ ￿ β3 deﬁned as follows:
￿ ￿ β3 =
￿
1 if ￿ β3 > 0
−1 if ￿ β3 < 0
￿
.
The results have been omitted, but remain qualitatively invariant although
the signiﬁcance of the estimates is much lower.
6. Conclusions
This paper argues that investor protection and law enforcement may be very
important in shaping the industrial structure of a country, as they aﬀect the eﬀort
and the resources that are necessary to monitor ﬁrms and to enforce contracts.
These costs inﬂuence the number of ﬁrms investors want to ﬁnance and, therefore,
the opportunities for risk sharing. When risk sharing opportunities are limited, a
ﬁrm can rely on a small number of ﬁnanciers. In this case, investors are willing
to invest only a limited amount of their resources in ﬁrms whose optimal scale is
larger, in order not to increase the covariance of their future consumption with
the ﬁrm’s output realization. Therefore, the ﬁnancial system puts a constraint on
ﬁrm size.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1 is proved by taking a linear approximation of the marginal utility























































where V (￿ Ri
1) is the variance of the return to investment in ﬁrm i and λ =




0di < W0 − nτ). If there is no investment in the risk free as-

















W0−nτ is the return of the whole portfolio of risky assets.









￿(W 1)V (￿ Ri
1) > 0 and, clearly, implies that the return
from investing in ﬁrm i is increasing in its portfolio share.
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